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Abstract Jonathan Kvanvig has recently attempted to reconcile the problem of
(apparently) pointless truths with the claim that the value of truth is unrestricted—
that truth is always and everywhere valuable. In this paper, I critically evaluate
Kvanvig’s argument and show it to be defective at a crucial juncture. I propose my
own alternative strategy for generating Kvanvig’s result—an alternative that parts
ways with Kvanvig’s own conception of the cognitively ideal.
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1 Two Kinds of Pointless Truths
On a wide range of issues, we’re after the truth, and whenwe’ve got it, it’s quite valuable
to us; in such cases, there will have been some point to our having found out what we
did. But on some issues, we simply don’t care on which side the truth falls. Sometimes,
our lack of interest in the truth is ‘criticisable’. Perhaps not always, though. 1 Are there
any truths such that there would be no point to caring about them, or ever coming to
have them? It does seem like there are. Ernest Sosa (2000) offers a description:
At the beach on a lazy summer afternoon, we might scoop up a handful of sand
and carefully count the grains. This would give us an otherwise unremarked truth,
something that on the view before us is at least a positive good, other things equal.
This view is hard to take seriously. The number of grains would not interest most
of us in the slightest. Absent any antecedent interest, moreover, it’s hard to see any
sort of value in one’s having that truth. (Sosa 2000, p. 156)
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1These truths which we don’t care about, however, wouldn’t be thereby pointless truths simply in virtue of
our not caring about them. For if they were, then for the student uninterested in history, it would be
pointless for him to ever learn about it. And for the man with no interests, it would be pointless to gain any
truths at all. This tells us that if some truths really are pointless, this wouldn’t be just because we don’t
care about them.
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Sosa’s grain-of-sand truth really does seem pointless. Plausibly, this pointlessness
is not simply a consequence of its being found uninteresting (an attitude which we
might have toward truths there would be a point to believe), but instead, a function
of a complete absence of any practical (or any other) value that would be generated
by believing such a truth.
As Jonathan Kvanvig (2008) has pointed out, pointlessness can be thought of as
coming in two varieties: first, there are those he calls basic research truths (e.g. truths
about the far reaches of the universe) which have no practical benefit, and in which
we inquire just for the sake of expanding our knowledge and understanding.
Secondly, there are those truths–such as those about the number of grains of sand on
some arbitrary section of a beach–that seem altogether pointless.
Neither basic research truths nor grains-of-sand truths generate any practical
benefit. Would there be any value in having such truths? If not, then one
consequence is clear: we must reject the thought that truth is always valuable. The
view that “truth is valuable,” as an unrestricted claim, would be false. A further
implication concerns knowledge: it’s not clear how one might go about defending
the value of knowing some truth that wouldn’t itself even be valuable to believe.
The problem raised by pointless truths is one that stands to threaten not only an
unqualified endorsement of the value of truth, but also knowledge. Let’s consider
now the matter of whether pointless truths really do lack value altogether.
2 Kvanvig on Pointlessness
2.1 Crass Pragmatism and Enlightened Pragmatism
Suppose the answer here is that they do: truths that have no practical value lack
value entirely. 2 Kvanvig calls such a view crass pragmatism and notes a worrying
implication: if this line were correct, we’d have no more reason to conduct basic
research as we would to count millions of grains of sand on a beach. He points out
that:
Noting this implication of the view should give us pause, since, to resort to a
bit of hyperbole, nobody in their right mind thinks that only applied research is
worth doing. (Kvanvig 2008, p. 11)
This much seems right, and so it must be false that truths that lack practical value
thereby lack any value. Perhaps, then, we should be taking a line whereby we could
defend basic research truths as more worthwhile than truths about sand on a beach.
Kvanvig calls this line enlightened pragmatism. The challenge for the enlightened
pragmatist will be to explain why basic research truths are more deserving of our
time and attention than paradigmatically pointless truths, even though basic research
truths (like grains-of-sand truths) bring about no positive practical value. Here
Kvanvig supposes the enlightened pragmatist could point out that basic research is
2 It should be noted that, on this view, there could not be any such thing as purely cognitive value apart
from practical value; truths that simply satisfy our curiosity whilst generating no practical value would fail
to be valuable truths.
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The appeal to logical or metaphysical necessity lacks the power to sort
pointless truths into those that are worth investigating and those that are not.
(Kvanvig 2008, p. 13)3
This bring us to an odd predicament: if crass pragmatism and enlightened
pragmatism are both untenable, then the only remaining line will be one that offers
the following verdict: that even though both kinds of pointless truths lack any
practical value, neither lacks value altogether. But if that is right, then we find
ourselves wedded to what would seem to be an unwelcome commitment: that
counting grains of sand on a beach is not, as Sosa thought, entirely without value.
2.2 Toward a Strong (Intellectualist) Line
The intellectualist takes the strong line opposite the crass pragmatist and maintains
that no truth lacks value altogether–including basic research truths and truths about
the number of blades of grass in your yard. Important to this line is the thought that
some truths can have purely cognitive value–value for which the pragmatist
positions had no room. The notion of purely cognitive or theoretical value is used by
Kvanvig to specify a particular kind of value that is, along with practical value (and
other values), part of what determines the value of some truth, all-things-considered.
If, as he thinks, the “ubiquitous phenomenon of curiosity” (2008, p. 4) reveals that
some of our concerns are purely theoretical, we may think of a truth’s cognitive
value as value the truth has in virtue of its relationship to these sorts of (theoretical)
concerns only, independently of any practical concerns we may have. And so, he
maintains, we would go about assessing the purely cognitive value of some truth by
controlling for the value it has in virtue of its relationship to non-cognitive, affective
states (e.g. desires). The ensuing thought experiment: “...Something has purely
cognitive value when it has value to individuals who care about nothing...” (Kvanvig
2008, p. 7).
Pointless truths (of both varieties) lack practical value, but can they have purely
cognitive value in the sense just described? If so, then would that be enough to show
that pointless truths do not threaten an unrestricted endorsement of the value of truth
(and ipso facto knowledge)? This depends. If the claim “all truths are valuable” is
supposed to be read as an all-things-considered claim, then even if some positive,
purely cognitive value was generated by believing (for example) that there are
34,576 hairs on my head, it’s far from clear that this would suffice to ensure that, all
things considered, the value generated by my believing this is positive. Quite simply,
3 Kvanvig’s point here is that, so long as it’s both logically and metaphysically possible that some
‘unusual and powerful ruler’ (2008, p. 13) made a given truth worthwhile to believe, it’s possible that
believing such truths would be worthwhile; he claims that the issue is the same when the applied to the
notion of ‘chance’ rather than possibility.
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worthwhile because it engenders the possibility or chance of practical benefits,
even if not the practical benefits themselves. But that’s an untenable claim to
defend; a defence would require some argument that distinguishes the grains-of-sand
truths from basic research truths by demonstrating the former, but not the latter, to
lack the possibility of being worth knowing, and as Kvanvig says:
the time and effort it would take me to count all those hairs would prevent me from
doing or thinking about a lot of other useful things. It might well be that, all-things-
considered, it would have been better for me not to have gained that truth.
This consideration invites the thought that there are, along with pointless truths,
bad truths–and further, it might seem that both pointless truths and bad truths stand
to undermine the thought that the value of truth (and knowledge) is unrestricted. I
contend that Kvanvig makes just the right move here in the way he dismisses the
apparent problem of bad truths, and his doing so provides a framework for dealing
with pointless truths. Regarding bad truths, Kvanvig admits the obvious point that
some truths are, all-things-considered, bad for us to believe; however, he points out
that the claim that the value of truth is unrestricted should not be read as an ultima
facie claim, but instead, as a prima facie claim. It is, as such, a defeasible claim, and
consequently, bad truths are just ones where other negative values serve as
overriding defeaters of whatever positive cognitive value was generated. In cases
of bad truths, then, negative moral or practical value (for example) could override
whatever value was prima facie positive and purely cognitive.
With that said, let us return to the question of whether the two varieties of
pointless truths really do have some limited prima facie cognitive value, as our
intellectualist line would commit us to. If not, then the problem of pointless truths
really does require that we (i) restrict the class of valuable truths to the class of non-
pointless truths, and (ii) restrict the class of valuable knowledge so that it includes
only knowledge of non-pointless truths.
2.3 Intellectualism and the Undercutter Model
On a first pass, the intellectualist programme looks hopeless. The challenge for this
programme, recall, was to account for some positive, prima facie cognitive value of
not only basic research truths, but pointless truths of the sort that Sosa described.
And the latter sort4 were ones that seemed to lack not only practical value but any
value at all. If that’s right, then a dangerous argument lurks: because pointless truths
have zero (or an absence of) non-cognitive value (i.e. practical value), the intellectualist
can uphold pointless truths as having some positive purely cognitive value only on the
pain of maintaining that the all-things-considered value generated by believing such
truths is positive. But that would just be to deny flat out that inquiring into some truths
really is a waste of time and would leave you no better off.
Kvanvig’s move here is to grant the assumption that, in the case of pointless
truths, the all-things-considered value is zero; his argument is that the limited,
positive prima facie value that is purely cognitive can be undercut–as opposed to
overridden–by a complete absence of any other positive values. And so the
undercutter model is supposed to explain how pointless truths are compatible with
the claim that the value of truth is unrestricted.
A subtle point must be noted here: the undercutter model is not itself sufficient for
escaping the problem of pointless truths. All it does is show that prima facie positive
cognitive value could be undercut in a way that is consistent with the thought that,
4 From here on, the relevant variety of pointless truths will be the latter, more threatening sort–and I’ll be
referring to those specifically as pointless truths.
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for pointless truths, there is no value generated by believing them whatsoever. The
undercutter model will be useful for escaping the problem of pointless truths only if
utilized in conjunction with some independent argument that establishes pointless
truths as the ones that really would have some prima facie positive cognitive value
which is defeated (undercut) by the absence of any other positive values. The burden
of the intellectualist is to show that pointless truths actually have some prima facie
positive value that gets undercut–as opposed to simply lacking any prima facie
positive cognitive value in the first place.
2.4 The Cognitive Ideal Argument
At this point in the problem, Kvanvig’s move is, I think, especially interesting, and it
will be the primary focus of what follows. If it works, then coupled with the
undercutter model, he’s given us a recipe for explaining away the problem of
pointless truths whilst upholding an unrestricted endorsement of the value of truth.
But how could anyone manage to argue, without begging the question, that all
truths, including pointless truths, have some prima facie, purely cognitive value?
His strategy is not to look at pointless truths and try to find value, but instead to
look at one who has cognitively valuable truths and try to find pointless ones:
We should ask ourselves what the cognitive ideal would involve. Here the
intellectualists have millennia of theological reflection on their side. Part of the
cognitive ideal, whatever else it may involve, is knowledge of all truths;
omniscience, for short. But for omniscience to be part of the ideal, no truth can
be pointless enough to play no role at all in the story of what it takes to be
cognitively ideal. (2008, p. 18)
We can formalize this argument as follows:
Cognitive Ideal Argument
1. The cognitive ideal consists in knowing all truths.
2. If some truth plays a role in the story of what it takes to be cognitively ideal,
that truth has at least some purely cognitive value.
3. All truths (including pointless truths) play a role in the story of what it takes
to be cognitively ideal.
4. All truths (including pointless truths) have at least some purely cognitive value.
Because (4) in conjunction with the undercutter model vindicate the intellectualist
position, we’ve arrived at the final piece in the puzzle and should now, by Kvanvig’s
light, have all we need to explain away pointless truths. While the undercutter model
is itself perhaps somewhat contentious, I’ll not be taking issue with it but rather I’ll
be taking issue squarely with the cognitive ideal argument. It is, I think, a very clever
and intriguing argument, but some of the most intriguing parts of the argument are
also those that will reveal it to be defective.
First, consider premise (2); a generalization of the claim would be something like:
“If some φ plays a role in the story of what it takes to be ψ ideal, then φ has at least
some purely ψ value.” A problem with this generalization implies that
enabling conditions, which can play a role in value explanations, would themselves
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have to be value bearers. But as Jonathan Dancy says, “...even if...enabling
conditions contribute to the explanation of the value of the whole, they do not do so
by way of contributing to that value in the way that the grounding features do.”
(Dancy 2004, p. 181). If pointless truths enable rather than contribute cognitive
value, then we have a straightforward reason to reject (2): pointless truths, if enablers
rather than contributors, could play a role in the story of what it takes to be
cognitively ideal without themselves being cognitively valuable.
Even if we were to suppose that pointless truths actually do contribute rather than
merely enable cognitive value–a point Kvanvig would need to argue for–there is yet
a deeper problem with the cognitive ideal argument, which is premise (1).
Consider an alternative to (1):
(1)* The cognitive ideal consists in being “omni-knowledgeable.”
Let’s suppose that one is omni-knowledgeable if one can know whatever one
wants to know whenever one wants to know it. This is an impressive property, and
on closer inspection, it's not at all clear why omniscience would be more apt to the
cognitive ideal. After all:
Divine omnipotence isn't thought to require of God that he do everything that
he is capable of doing. Why then suppose God must know everything he is
capable of knowing?
If (1)* is a plausible alternative to (1), then it’s easy to see how the cognitive ideal
argument collapses; pointless truths and the cognitive ideal would come apart. And even if
an omni-knowledgeable being knew all truths, it would be the being’s cognitive powers,
and not what he knew, that played a part in story for what it takes to be cognitively ideal.
There are other lines of objection, though, to premise (1) which don’t require that
we account for a being’s being cognitively ideal in terms of its cognitive powers. It
could be argued that the cognitive ideal is not omniscient on the grounds that the
cognitive ideal would know all truths that are not pointless, and of pointless issues,
just that they are pointless (whilst not actually knowing the pointless truths
themselves). Duncan Pritchard5 has suggested such a proposal, and Kvanvig
anticipates something similar. His response comes by way of a thought experiment
which is supposed to place (1) on unshakeable ground.
2.4.1 Thought Experiment
Imagine a world with two beings, each claiming to be cognitively ideal. One is
omniscient and the other isn’t. The less-than-omniscient being claims to be
cognitively ideal in virtue of knowing all the important truths, but the omniscient
being demurs. For among the important truths are the claims about what the
omniscient being knows that the less- than-omniscient being doesn’t know. Even
if the issue concerning a given proposition is assumed to be pointless and not
worthy of being known, the fact that the omniscient being knows the truth value in
question and the less-than-omniscient being does not is itself a distinctive
difference between the two beings. Moreover, the specific knowledge in question
5 Thanks to Pritchard for bringing this point up in conversation.
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is also an important difference: that the omniscient being knows that the claim is
true, for example, and the less-than-omniscient being doesn’t, establishes a
significant difference in terms of their grasp of the precise nature of the world in
which they find themselves. Once one appreciates this result of the thought
experiment, one can see why lesser accounts of the cognitive ideal collapse into
the stronger account. (Kvanvig 2008, p. 19)
This thought experiment boils down to the following argument.
Let O-truths represent whatever truths distinguish the omniscient being from the
less-than-omniscient being.
1. O-truths are among the class of important truths.
2. The less-than-omniscient being must know all O-truths.
3. The less-than-omniscient being knows all O-truths only if he knows what specific
knowledge the omniscient being has that the less-than-omniscient being lacks.
4. If the less-than-omniscient being knows what specific knowledge the omniscient
being has that he (the less-than-omniscient) being lacks, then the less-than-
omniscient being is omniscient.
5. The less-than-omniscient being is (actually) omniscient.
There are several strange things going on in this argument. For one thing, (4) is a
logical falsehood. The antecedent is true only if the consequent is false. Also, notice
that Kvanvig accidentally commits himself to counting all pointless truths as
important truths. This was the move in premises (1), (2) and (3). It gets him the
result that the important truth knower must know all pointless truths, but at the
expense of eliminating any distinction between truths that are important and truths
that aren’t. If there’s really no distinction, then we’re saying nothing different in
calling a given truth pointless as important. But not all truths are important (or for
that matter, pointless), and so this is unacceptable.
3 Understanding and the Cognitive Ideal
If pointless truths are to be shown to have some defeasible cognitive value, we’d need a
better argument. I think there is one in the neighbourhood. But first, we have to stop
thinking of the cognitive ideal within a narrow framework that leaves us debating what it
is that the cognitive ideal would have to know. Knowledge is not the only cognitive
achievement befitting the cognitive ideal; understanding is at least an equally important
achievement, and one that would plausibly play a necessary role in explaining what
makes up the cognitive ideal. After all, it would hardly be cognitively ideal to know all
but understand little.6 And given the factive nature of understanding, it turns out that
6 Such a case is clearly possible. The possibility is entailed by the fact that one can know propositions P1
... Pn and yet fail to understand subject matter α where α is something understood only by one who knows
P1 ... Pn but also further grasps, for instance, the coherence-making relations between various items of
knowledge within P1 ... Pn. For example, a student might know–say, through memorisation on the basis of
expert testimony, that certain axioms of quantificational logic are true. The student might, however,
plausibly fail to understand quantificational logic. The student might fail to grasp the relationship between
the axioms that would be requisite for applying quantification logic argument evaluation. It would be hard
to accept that the student understands quantificational logic, even though the student knows P1 ... Pn.
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ideal understanding is, not unlike omniscience, something that will require a wide
class of truths.
I should distinguish here two varieties of understanding, as only one will be
relevant here. The variety that will not be relevant is what has been called
propositional understanding, which refers to instances when it is single propositions,
as opposed to wider sets of propositions, that stand as the object of understanding. A
familiar usage of understanding in this sense might be cases where someone tells
you (perhaps smugly) something you already know. You reply: “I understand that
the plane has been delayed.” As Berit Brogaard (2005) has noted, propositional
understanding collapses into propositional knowledge. Objectual understanding, on
the other hand, does not. Objectual understanding has as its objects such things as
subject matter but also can take on objects much wider. For example, you can
understand a specific subject matter like chemistry, or a broader phenomenon, such
as why Scandinavian countries are typically more socialist than their European
neighbours.
I offer that, for the purposes of considering how we might characterize the
cognitive ideal in terms of what she understands (as opposed to knows), we may
evaluate (objectual) understanding along two dimensions.
The first is comprehensiveness. Two historians might both be rightly said to
understand how the West was won. But the degrees of comprehensiveness might
differ–one historian might have a more comprehensive understanding than the other.
The more comprehensive an understanding of some matter, the more befitting of the
cognitive ideal.
The second dimension is breadth. Returning to our historians, one might under-
stand the major developments in the Western but not Eastern Intellectual tradition,
whilst the other historian might understand both traditions, their similarities, and
points of disconnect. Clearly, the sort of understanding befitting the cognitive ideal
will be of a maximal breadth.
I’m going to offer a simple argument now:
1. The cognitive ideal consists (at least in part) in cognitively ideal understanding.
2. If understanding could possibly be of a greater breadth than it is, it is not cogni-
tively ideal.
3. If understanding could possibly be more comprehensive than it is, then it is not
cognitively ideal.
4. Understanding could be of the greatest possible breadth and the greatest possible
comprehension only if encompassing all truths.
5. The cognitive ideal consists (at least in part) in understanding that encompasses
all truths.
If this argument is correct, then we’ll have escaped the problem of pointless
truths, and without the intellectualist audacity of supposing that a cognitively ideal
agent would believe them for the sake of believing them. Pointless truths are indeed
pointless to believe for the sake of believing. While such beliefs are, in themselves,
pointless to have, cognitively ideal understanding is not pointless to have. And given
that cognitively ideal understanding encompasses all truths, we have a story for why
even pointless truths have some defeasible cognitive value–value which can of
course be undercut (in the absence of any other positive values).
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I want to mention a final point about the value of pointless truths, which I hope
will clarify the remarks just made. I am conceiving of the value of pointless truths as
(defeasibly) cognitively valuable in virtue of their contribution to a whole
(cognitively ideal understanding). Unlike Kvanvig, then, I think the unrestricted
value of truth is something we can defend only if we think of the defeasible value of
pointless truths as contributory value–value that, as Ramon Lemos puts it, “anything
has...by virtue of its contributing to the value of some whole of which it is a part.”
(Lemos 1995, p. 41) I suspect, in conclusion, that one reason the problem of
pointless truths has seemed so troubling owes to the tendency to reason as follows:
pointless truths lack practical value, and so if they’re valuable at all, their value must
be cognitive value, and if only cognitively valuable, then we must find some
argument to explain why it’s valuable to believe them for their own sake. Once these
concessions are made, the only way out will be to make some move–as Kvanvig
did–which could account for why the value of such truths (even if defeasible) is final
value–that is, that there is some limited (defeasible) cognitive value that arises from
believing them because believing them is cognitively valuable. I’ve offered that we
resist this sort of stubborn intellectualism, which–as it turned out–wasn’t needed
after all in order to uphold the milder intellectualist tenet that the value of truth is
unrestricted.
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